Through virus-based reconnaissances, the attacker may compromise critical power substations and induce power outages. Meanwhile, the power system operator may conduct defensive measures to prevent virus-spreading. In this paper, a graphical evolutionary game model is developed to solve the equilibrium of competitions between virus propagations and countermeasures, which helps to evaluate the cyber-security risk of power systems under long-term virus-based intrusions. In the proposed game model, the virus is supposed to propagate itself in a cyber network connecting cyber nodes belonging to power substations. Each cyber node may play as an attacker or a defender according to its state. A death-birth rule is adopted to model probabilistic strategies and state transfers, which reflects the bounded rationality of the viruses. Then, an evolution dynamic equation is derived to obtain the portion of the infected substations when the equilibrium is reached, and simulation algorithm is also given to estimate the infection probability of each substation under the persistent virus-based intrusion. Assuming a virus may trip all breakers in the infected substation, the cyber-security risk is evaluated to identify system-level vulnerabilities. The IEEE 118-bus system with a layered cyber network is used for case studies. Test results validate the proposed model and provide further insights into the virus-based intrusion.
I. INTRODUCTION A. MOTIVATION
Cyber attacks pose serious threats to modern power systems. Before causing disruptive impacts, the attacker may spend a long-time to intrude the cyber system. For example, the ''Dragonfly'' malware had lurked in some power companies for almost 4 years [1] , and the ''Stuxnet'' malware took several years to compromise the industrial control system (ICS) [2] , [3] . Thus, models of virus-based intrusions tend to be valuable, which reveal the risk to power systems caused by long-term and persistent cyber threats.
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In accordance with the attack that occurred in Ukraine [4] , a special cyber-attack scenario is considered, where the attacker injects a virus into the cyber network of the power system. Then, this virus may explore more cyber vulnerabilities and spread over the cyber network to infect and compromise the power substations. Once gaining control over the substation, it may launch attacks to create outages by switching off all breakers in this substation. It is necessary for the system operator take defensive measures to prevent the virus-spreading. Thus, in the long-term, the virus-based intrusion and corresponding countermeasures are competing with each other over the cyber network.
To study the virus-based cyber attack, we can use a game model to describe the interaction between cyber intrusion and VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ the defense actions. By solving the equilibrium of such a game, the long-term cyber-security risk of the power system can be evaluated, which renders insights of the vulnerable components that are required enhanced protections against persistent intrusions.
B. RELATED WORK
To evaluate the risk of each substation under the virus-based intrusions, interactions between the intruder and the defender have been thoroughly investigated by applying the game theories. Considering the sequence of actions taken by defenders and attackers, the attack-defense model [5] , [6] and the defense-attack-defense model [7] , [8] were developed. Through solving these static game models, the optimal interaction strategies of both attackers and defenders were obtained. In [9] , a probabilistic and dynamic game of cyber attack and defense was studied. The optimal decisions of players were obtained by solving dynamic programming problems nested in the game. Furthermore, in [10] , [11] , we developed new game models of virus-based cyber attacks and countermeasures, where persistent cyber threats were considered. Test results revealed that by adopting reinforcement learning, the virus-based cyber attacks might take advantage of long-term and evolutionary interactions with the system operator and create disruptive impacts after infecting many power substations. In this paper, by focusing on the long-term interactions between virus-based intrusion and countermeasures, an evolutionary game model is proposed, which extends our previous work and provides more insights into the virus-based cyber-security threats. The works on cyber-security games of power systems normally take the assumption that the attackers have full knowledge and information about the power system. Recently, several studies have demonstrated that even with limited knowledge [12] - [14] of the targeted power system, the attacker may still launch harmful cyber-attacks. By considering the limited knowledge, these attack methods tend to be more practical. Following these works, we further specify the cyber attackers as viruses injected into the cyber network, whose knowledge can not be rich as it must be concisely programmed. Moreover, as introduced in [15] , the virusspreading over a network generally presents the following two features: 1) Long-term: Viruses take a long period to propagate among devices. 2) Bounded rationality: Viruses intrude the substations through the scanned vulnerabilities. Its rationality must be bounded. Therefore, in this work, a longterm intrusion-defense game is developed with considerations of the bounded rationality of a virus.
For predicting the dominated strategies taken by populations with fixed topology, evolutionary game models have been developed, in which the long-term and bounded rational behaviors of individuals are carefully described [16] - [19] . Authors of [20] analyzed the information diffusion process over social networks with a graphical evolutionary game. Moreover, a similar game model was also applied to optimize the distributed adaptive networks [21] . Inspired by the above works, we formulate the virus propagation over the cyber network as a graphical evolutionary game in this paper. Based on the equilibrium solution of this game, the cyber-security risks of the power substations can be further estimated.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, a risk assessment method is proposed to identify vulnerable substations under persistent virus-based intrusions. The virus is assumed to be able to propagate in the cyber network, and the rationality of the virus is bounded to infect and compromise as many substations as possible. On the other hand, the system operator may conduct proactive and reactive countermeasures to mitigate virus infections. The long-term and evolutionary interactions between virus-based intrusions and system protections are modeled as a graphical evolutionary game. By solving this game, the probability of virus infection in each substation is predicted. Then, the losses of power outages caused by the infected viruses are estimated under the worst-case conditions, in which all external links of the attacked substation are cut off. Finally, the risk evaluation can be conducted according to the infection probability and potential attack loss of substations, which helps to identify system-level vulnerabilities against persistent threats from virus-based intrusions. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) A novel graphical evolutionary game model is developed to describe the long-term evolution of virus propagation on the cyber network of a power system. In the proposed game model, the virus propagates in a cyber network that connects power substations. Each cyber node may take intrusive or defensive strategies with regards to its infection state. A death-birth rule is adopted to drive probabilistic strategy and state transfers, which reflects the bounded rationality of the virus.
2) An equation describing the evolution dynamics of the game is derived, which not only renders the sufficient conditions for the game to have an equilibrium but also helps to solve the portion of infected substations when the equilibrium is reached. Moreover, a simulation algorithm is also proposed to estimate the infection probability of each substation under the persistent virus-based intrusions.
3) A new risk assessment index reflecting the security level of substations is defined under the long-term virus-based intrusions. Considering a virus may trip all breakers in the infected substation, the cyber-security risk is evaluated to identify system-level vulnerabilities.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the virus-based intrusion and risk assessment model. In Section III, the graphical evolution game is introduced to describe the virus intrusion process and the equilibrium of the game is studied. Then, Section IV presents the algorithm to calculate the infection probability of the nodes with the game model. Section V introduces the detailed procedures required by the cyber-security risk assessment.
Test results are given in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION A. VIRUS-BASED INTRUSION AND CORRESPONDING COUNTERMEASURES
The cyber network of a power system connects substations and control centers. Normally, the cyber-security defense of a control center is much stronger than those of the substations. Thus, in this work, the virus-based intrusion aims at compromising power substations, which are critical nodes in both the cyber network and the physical power grid. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that all cyber systems in the power system are homogeneous. Here, the cyber network of a power system is represented by a graph noted as
where N c is the collection of cyber nodes corresponding to each power substation, and E c is the collection of communication channels linking them.
We assume that the virus will try to spread in the cyber network and attack the physical power grid autonomously. After being injected into the network, it will try to infect other substations through network probing. Then, the virus may launch attacks to disturb normal operations of the power system. Here, according to [4] , a straightforward attack strategy is adopted: the virus would open all breakers in the compromised substation to create outages.
Considering the virus-spreading, the cyber nodes serving power substations can be denoted as infected or susceptible ones. The latter refers to those that have not been infected. The infected cyber nodes would act like attackers as conducting illegal reconnaissance activities on neighboring cyber nodes. Meanwhile, all the susceptible nodes would take proactive and reactive countermeasures, such as the firewall, intrusion detection system (IDS) and anomaly detection system (ADS), to eliminate local vulnerabilities and stop the virus-spreading.
B. EQUILIBRIUM STATE OF THE VIRUS-SPREADING GAME
The interactions between the virus-based intrusion and mitigation constitute an evolutionary game, in which the infection state and action strategy of each cyber node change dynamically due to the interactions between neighbors.
Especially, two important features of the virus propagation are considered in this game model: 1) This game could last for a relatively long term before the cyber attack happens. As reported in [3] , some virus lurked in the ICS for years; 2) The virus may infect different cyber nodes, each of which works independently with bounded rationality. That is, it could try to penetrate all reachable cyber systems of neighboring substations, even when they were already infected.
It should be noted when the players are bounded-rational, an evolutionary game may not converge to a ''fitnessmaximizing equilibrium'', but to an evolutionarily stable state, which predicts the ultimate equilibrium of the evolutionary dynamics. Regarding the virus-spreading in the power system, when the equilibrium is reached, the following two necessary conditions will be satisfied: 1) The ratio of infected nodes becomes stable; 2) For one cyber node, its infection probability tends to be steady.
Given a time period, we can estimate the infection probability of a cyber node by evaluating the rate of all states observed. Remember that the state and strategy of one cyber node change dynamically and randomly because of the virus-spreading. However, after the equilibrium is reached, the infection probability of each cyber node tends to be steady if the observation window is long enough. To verify the necessary conditions of the equilibrium state of the virus-spreading game, two investigation methods are developed: 1) Analyzing the stable infection rate of all cyber nodes by solving the evolution dynamic equations of the evolutionary game; 2) Evaluating the infection probability of a cyber node by simulating its stochastic state transfers during the game.
C. CYBER SECURITY RISK DUE TO VIRUS-BASED INTRUSION
When the infection probability of a cyber node is estimated, the cyber-security risk of the host substation can be evaluated by considering the corresponding losses of virus-caused cyber attacks. Such a risk can be expressed as,
where P i−node indicates the infection probability of the i-th node in N c when the virus intrudes G c . Loss i−load denotes the load loss when the i-th substation is attacked in the worst attack scenario. By ranking the risks of all substations, the system operator may identify the vulnerable stations and make better decisions on cyber security enhancements. To perform the required risk assessment, Loss i−load should be estimated reasonably. In this work, the load loss in the worst attack scenario is estimated for each substation, where optimal dispatches for minimizing the losses are carefully considered.
III. GRAPHICAL EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL OF LONG-TERM VIRUS-BASED INTRUSION A. BASICS OF A GRAPHICAL EVOLUTIONARY GAME
Graphical evolutionary game is used to study the interactions among numerous players, which are bounded rational and influenced by spatial relationships. For the virus-based intrusion, the infected and susceptible cyber nodes take different strategies to enlarge their populations, which can be modeled as a graphical evolutionary game on the cyber network of power systems.
Generally, to formulate a graphical evolutionary game, six elements need to be specified, including the graph topology, players, strategies, action payoff, fitness function, and strategy update rules. Readers may refer to [20] and [22] for a detailed definition of these elements.
In this work, the cyber network of the power system determines the topological relations between game players, which can be regarded as a graph topology. The detailed models of the other five elements are described below.
B. THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHICAL EVOLUTION GAME MODEL 1) GAME PLAYERS
Remember that the cyber system of a substation is modeled as a node in the cyber network graph G c . When the virus begins to propagate, each cyber node becomes either infected or susceptible as the intrusion continues. In the game, the set of susceptible nodes is denoted as s, while d represents the set of infected nodes. These nodes are the players in this game.
2) STATE-BASED STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS
In the proposed game model, all players share the same purpose to change neighbor cyber nodes to the same state as themselves. The cyber nodes will scan vulnerabilities of neighbors and take advantage of such vulnerabilities to infect more substations. Meanwhile, the susceptible nodes are protected by reactive defense measures such as intrusion detections or anomaly detections for blocking the viruses. They may also take proactive defense measures such as virus scans to reduce vulnerabilities of themselves, which may stop the virus spreading. As the game goes on, the infection state of a cyber node changes dynamically, and consequently following which its action strategy also shifts.
3) ACTION PAYOFFS
When the players execute intrusion actions, they will obtain certain payoffs, which strengthens their fitnesses. We assume that the computation capacity of a cyber node is proportional to the ability of finding vulnerabilities in this substation.
For the virus and defensive software, available computation resources, such as the CPU time, network ports and file storage are critical for them to carry out actions. Such computation resources belonging to a cyber node are abstracted as a unified computation capacity α. Then, the payoffs of players can be defined as the obtained computation capacities, which are determined by both the usages of local resources and the influences from neighboring nodes. The usage functions of the computation capacity for the infected and susceptible nodes are given as follows:
where C A stands for the computation capacity used for intrusion process by the infected substation, C P and C R represent efforts paid for the proactive and reactive defenses against virus-based intrusions, respectively. β and γ are two efficiency factors in [0, 1]. There are various methods for estimating C A and C P . For example, C A can be taken as the proportion of infected servers in the substation, while C P and C R are proportional to the uninfected servers.
Since the state-based strategies and actions are adopted in this game, the influences of the neighboring cyber nodes on the payoff of a local node are dependent on states of all these nodes. For two adjacent nodes x and y, let binary variables z x and z y stand for their states, which can be 0 for infected or 1 for susceptible. When evaluating the payoff of the node y, there are four possibilities (i) z x = 1, z y = 1: There are no interactions between two susceptible nodes. Then, their reactive defenses are not activated. Only the proactive defense action of x provides a payoff equaling C P . (ii) z x = 1, z y = 0: After being infected, the node y will perform malicious reconnaissances on the node x, while the reactive defense of x will reduce negative effects caused by the intrusion. The payoff obtained by x can be represented as
Here, the second term denotes the defense effect against reconnaissances of the infected neighbor node y. (iii) z x = 0, z y = 1: In this situation, y needs to defense malicious reconnaissances conducted by x. For y, its payoff comes from the computation capacity loss of Y as max{0,
scanning y to explore more vulnerabilities. As y is compromised and loses defense abilities, x gains a payoff equal to its computation capacity as C A . In a summary, for the above four situations, the payoff of x can be evaluated as
where u D x (z y ) and u A x (z y ) are the state-based payoff functions defined as below.
Considering that the cyber nodes are homogeneous, the payoffs of y are the same as those of x. From equation (5), payoffs of x under different situations are calculated and presented in Table 1 . 
4) FITNESS FUNCTIONS
Fitness represents the cumulative return of a player in the long-term evolution. Generally, in a graphical evolution game [23] , the fitness function of a player can be expressed as,
where B is a constant denoting as baseline fitness. U represents payoffs obtained from its neighbors. ω is a ratio factor.
As elaborated in [24] , to enable state propagations, B can be chosen as 1, while ω satisfies 0 < ω 1. Suppose that the cyber node x has k neighboring nodes, which compose a node set as Y = {y i }, i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The fitness function of x can be evaluated as
As mentioned before, the state of a cyber node can shift between the s and d. Following the changes of its state, the action strategy also shifts. It is assumed that such a shifting of states and strategies is caused by the influences of neighboring nodes. That is, a cyber node may adopt the state-based strategy of its neighbors in a probabilistic way.
To model the updates of strategies, the death-birth (DB) [22] rule is applied in the proposed game. The basic idea of the DB rule is that a random player replaces its strategy by one of the neighbors with a probability in a round of the game. This probability can be assigned as the proportion of the accumulated fitness of grouped players using the same strategy to the summary of all neighbors' fitness. The DB rule reflects the impacts of the neighbors. Fig. 1 illustrates the specific evolution process based on the DB rule. The node in the middle is supposed to conduct a strategy update. In this process, the node first abandons its original strategy (i.e., death process), and then selects the strategy of one of the neighbors as its own strategy (i.e., birth process). When a node x is selected to play games with the neighborhood, x performs the strategy/state update according to the DB rule. Then, we have the probability of its state and strategy shifting evaluated as follows, (i) The probability of x to shift from susceptible state to infected one is
(ii) On the contrary, the probability that an infected node x turns to be susceptible one is
The DB rule embodies the bounded rationality of the players in the virus-based intrusion. The knowledge possessed by the infected and susceptible nodes in the proposed game is quite limited, which makes them influenced by neighbors with certain probabilities. It is such bounded rationality that leads to uncertainty in the strategy updates of these players.
C. EVOLUTION DYNAMICS EQUATIONS OF WHOLE NETWORK STATE
It is essential that the proposed game can converge to an equilibrium, at which the evolutionary dynamics of virus spreading becomes stable. In this section, we investigate the condition of the existence of the equilibrium. Then a replicator equation is derived to solve the equilibrium state analytically.
1) EXISTENCE CONDITIONS OF THE EQUILIBRIUM STATE
In [22] , conditions for an evolutionary game to reach an equilibrium state were discussed. These conditions can be interpreted as three scenarios resulted from the proposed virus-spreading game. 
, the state s is risk-dominant and pareto-efficient over the state d. The cyber security of the power system is always guaranteed. The equilibrium state satisfies that (1, 0) and u x (0, 0) > u x (1, 1) , one of states is riskdominant, and the other one is pareto-efficient. The final proportion of the infected substations relies on the initial state of the virus-spreading. When the third scenario is encountered, it is necessary to develop a set of replicator equations to solve the equilibrium state of the proposed game. These differential equations reflect the evolutionary dynamic of the virus spreading.
In the Appendix A-A, the replicator equations are derived bu considering the probability distribution of infected nodes as well as the fitness transformation of such nodes. Eventually, the evolutionary dynamics of the proposed game can be represented as the equations below,
where P d and P dd are taken as the state variables of evolutionary dynamics. Here, P d denotes the infection rate of VOLUME 7, 2019 all cyber nodes in the power grid, while P dd stands for the proportion of edges connecting two d nodes. The variables with represents the amount of change of corresponding variables. The first term of (12) describes the growth trend of the infection rate, while the second term shows the reduction of infected nodes. As for the dynamic of P dd , in accordance with the handshake lemma [25] , the total number of the edges in the network can be estimated as kN 2 , where k is the average number of neighboring nodes. Regarding the relationship among nodes and edges, when a node changes its state to d, P dd is increased by k d / kN 2 , and vice versa. It can be seen that in (12) and (13), interactions between virus-spreading and cyber protections are modeled, which change the state of nodes and edges in the cyber network of the power grid dynamically. WhenṖ d = 0 andṖ dd = 0, the equilibrium state of this evolution game is reached. As is well known, such a state can be stable only if the Jacobian matrix J of (12) and (13) satisfies that det(J) > 0 and trace(J) < 0.
2) THE EQUILIBRIUM OBTAINED FROM REPLICATOR EQUATIONS
From (12) and (13), we can solve the equilibrium state of the proposed game analytically as below,
where
Detailed derivation of (14) can be found in Appendix B. It should be noted that this equilibrium state recovers the infection rate of all cyber nodes when the virus-spreading lasts long enough. It may not be useful in determining the infection probability of a certain substation but can provide an indicator for the simulation of stochastic dynamics of the virus-based intrusion to terminate. Moreover, by analyzing the condition and the result of this equilibrium state, insights of this virus-based intrusion and protection game can be obtained.
IV. SIMULATION ALGORITHM FOR CALCULATING THE INFECTION PROBABILITY OF NODES
To evaluate the infection probability of each node during the evolution, a simulation method is developed. The basic idea is to simulate the evolutionary game of intrusion and defense for a long enough time. If the equilibrium of the game can be reached by simulation, the infection frequency of a node can be accounted for estimating its infection probability.
The algorithm 1 describes the simulation method for terminating the infection probability of each cyber node, where q x , x ∈ N c is defined to represent the times that the selected node x get infected, and q all represents the total rounds of the simulation after the evolution reaches equilibrium. At the beginning of the simulation, the required parameters Algorithm 1 The Simulation Algorithm of Evaluating Infection Probability 1: Establish the cyber network G c ; set the parameters C A , C P and C R in (2), (3) and (4) and the round of evolutions Iter; let q x = 0, x ∈ N c and q all = 0 2: Calculate payoffs with C A , C P , C R and (5) 3: Determine the initial infected node x I ∈ N c , i.e., z x I = 0. 4: for 1 to Iter do 5: Randomly select a node x ∈ N c 6:
Record z x of x and z Y of the surrounding nodes Y 7:
Calculate f x and f y i with (9) based on z x and z Y 8:
if z x = 1 then 9: Calculate P s→d of x with (10).
10:
Generate a random number Rand ∈ [0, 1].
11:
if Rand > P s→d then 12: Update z x , i.e., let z x = 0 13: end if 14: else 15: Calculate P d→s of x with (11).
16:
Generate a random number Rand ∈ [0, 1]. 17: if Rand > P d→s then 18: Update z x , i.e., let z x = 1 19: end if 20: end if 21: if Evolution reaches stability then 22: q all = q all + 1 23: if z x = 0 then 24: q x = q x + 1 25: end if 26: end if 27 : end for 28: Use the infection frequency to estimate the corresponding infection probability P i−node of each node:
are initialized. G c formed the foundation of the game model. C A , C P , and C R are set to obtain the payoffs of the game. The initial infection node x I is selected. The impact of initial node selection on simulation is illustrated in the VI-C1. Then, the counter Iter is assigned to determine how long the evolution will last. In this work, Iter is taken as 10 5 to keep the evolution last a long-term as well as to grantee that it converges to an equilibrium state. In a round of the evolution, a random node x is chosen to update its state. Based on the DB rules and states of x and Y , fitness function f x and the probability of x to shift its state are calculated in turns. Then a random number Rand is generated. The comparison between the probability and Rand determines whether the state of x will change. So far, a round of evolution is over. When we observe that the proportion of nodes in each state does not change substantially, the evolution goes to an ESS. Then, the state of each node is recorded to evaluate q all and q x . Finally, the infection probability of each node can be estimated with infection frequency using (15) . The simulation after the evolution reaches stability is important, which rends not only the equilibrium state of the whole network but also the state of each individual node.
V. SUBSTATION RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER THE INTRUSION
The steps of risk assessment are shown in Fig. 2 . It describes a framework to evaluate risks under the persistent intrusion of an attacker. Then, by combining with the Algorithm 1, the risk assessment of each substation can be computed through the following steps: Step 1: Generate the cyber network G c of the power system. Initialize the parameters of the Algorithm 1. Then, conduct the Algorithm 1 to calculate the infection probability P i−node of each node in N c .
Step 2: Calculate the load loss of each node in the worst-attack scenario. An optimization model based on the DC power flow is used. When a substation is under the attack caused by viruses, all the transmission lines connected to it are considered to be disconnected. Each substation's load loss can be calculated with the following steps.
First, build a DC power flow based optimization model for computing the load loss. Suppose that there are n nodes in N p and m lines in E p . Define p = [p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ] T , where p j represents the injection power of the j-th node. Define F = [F 1 , F 2 , . . . F m ] T , where F l represents the value of power flow. Besides, Gen is the set of buses with generators, and D is the set of buses with a load.
Considering the constraints of the power balance, the generator output, and the transmission line capacity, the following optimization problems can be applied with the goal of minimizing the sum of system operation cost and loss:
where c j represents the unit cost of power generation of the j-th generation, W k represents the economic loss caused by the k-th node cutting unit load, and P dk represents the load demand of the k-th node. A is a matrix related to the structure of G p . p max g j and p min g j are the upper and lower limits of the jth generator output, while F max L is the limit of the l-th line's power transmission capacity. In this optimization model, the p is solved.
When the optimization model is built, the load losses under different scenarios can be calculated. Here, G c = {N p , E p } represents the attack-free power grid. Select a substation i as the attack target. Then, generate the new power grid topology G i p = {N i p , E i p }, i ∈ N p assuming the breakers of substation i are tripped. Then, for G p and each G i p , model (16) is used to solve the p and p i , respectively. By comparing p with each p i , the load loss Loss i−load caused by attacking substation i can be estimated.
Step 3: Combining with the P i−node obtained by Step 1 and Loss i−load obtained by Step 2, the risk of each substation in N c can be solved with (1).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section validates the single substation risk assessment model under the threat of intrusion. First, the test system and simulation parameters are designed. Then, the risks of each substation are calculated. Finally, we further study the impact of different initial intrusion positions on virus spread and the specific dynamic evolution process.
A. TEST SYSTEM AND SIMULATION PARAMETERS 1) TEST SYSTEM
The standard 118-bus system is used for case studies. The buses and the transmission lines form the physical network G p . For the cyber network G c , considering that the 118-bus system can be divided into three regions [26] , dispatch centers are set in each region separately, which are recorded as 119, 120 and 121. The structure of G c is shown in Fig. 3 . 
2) SIMULATION PARAMETERS
To simulate the process of virus spread, the payoff matrix which calculated by C A , C P and C R should be designed. In our research, we set the baseline value of each cyber node's computational capacity as 1, i.e., α = 1. The parameters are presented in Table 2 . Case 1 and case 3 correspond to two extreme situations. In case 1, the cyber nodes of the system are biased toward proactive defense (larger C P ). This intrusion ability of the intruder is weak (smaller C A ). In case 3, the defense ability of each node is more allocated to the reactive defense (larger C R ), while the virus's intrusion ability is very strong. Case 2 is more in line with the general intrusion-defense model. Based on the cases and the parameters, simulations are performed by using the proposed game method.
B. RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBSTATIONS UNDER VIRUS-BASED INTRUSIONS
In this section, the risks of the substations are evaluated. First, the viruses spread over the whole system and state shifting of each node are exhibited. Then, the load losses caused by the attacker under the worst case are given. Finally, the risk indices are calculated.
1) THE VIRUS PROPAGATION OVER THE CYBER NETWORK
In this part, virus propagation is studied from macro-and micro-perspectives, which reflected the internal mechanism of the dynamic evolution.
(i) The proportion of infected cyber nodes during virus spread (from a macro perspective): Suppose that the virus begins to intrude G c from node 1. For each simulation, the process is simulated 10 5 steps to guarantee that the proportion of the infected nodes has reached an equilibrium. After each round of the game, the number of infected nodes will be counted. Fig. 4 shows the trend of the proportion of infected cyber nodes in the grid over time in all three cases. In Fig. 4 , the horizontal axis represents the number of rounds that the evolutionary game has already been played. The vertical axis represents the proportion of the infected nodes. Both simulation results and equilibriums of each situation are exhibited in the figure. The equilibrium of the experimental data and theoretical results are very close. Therefore, the comparison results can explain the correctness of our work. Due to space limitations, only the first 3 × 10 4 rounds of the simulation are presented in the figure. As shown in Fig. 4 , cases 1 and 3 correspond to two distinct virus spread scenarios. In case 1, when the grid implements a proactive defense, the virus has difficulty in spreading on the cyber network. With (1), the risk of each substation is almost 0. According to the results, something interesting can be explored: If an intruder continues to intrude a certain substation in case 1, it is still possible to infect a portion of the nodes. This result shows thatpartial intrusion is inevitable no matter how strong the defense is. In case 2, the virus can only infect part of the nodes. Affected by the defensive capability and the intrusion capability, the proportion of the infected cyber nodes in the system will reach an equilibrium. Due to the heterogeneity of the topology, the proportion will fluctuate significantly. For case 3, although the cyber nodes have reactive defense abilities, when the intruder has a strong intrusion capability, the virus may also achieve infection of the entire network. That is, the cyber node of a substation cannot only rely on the reactive defense. At this time, the risk of each substation is proportional to Loss i−load . All of the above cases are consistent with our intuition. (ii) Dynamic process of virus propagation among cyber nodes (from a micro perspective): The result in Fig. 4 exhibits the fluctuation of the proportion of infected cyber nodes under different situations. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to illustrate the specific process of each node occurs in the dynamic evolution. The dynamics in case 2 are exhibited in Fig. 5 , which illustrates the process of the virus spreading in the cyber network of the power system, and exhibits the state changes of each node. The horizontal axis represents the round of the evolutionary game, and the vertical axis represents the cyber node in N c . The white color indicates that the node is at s-state in one round of the evolution, while the black color represents that the cyber node is at d-state. The color change of a cyber node also means the states and strategies shifting, which follow the strategy update rules (DB rules). Fig. 5 indicates that in the long-term evolution, the games between the viruses and defenders are dynamic. The viruses can intrude the cyber node secretly, while the defenders can bring the infected node back to susceptible.
In the long-term graphical evolution, nodes are constrained with the spatial relationship, which means that one node only has limited knowledge of the entire network. The limited knowledge that nodes possessed reflects their bounded rationality. It is the existence of bounded rationality that triggers the dynamic change of the node's state. The neighbors' states, not the states of the nodes on the entire network, determine the behavior of the node.
2) LOAD LOSSES CAUSED BY THE ATTACK
The load level is affected by many factors such as seasonal climate, so the risk will also change with different load levels. In this case, the data of the standard system is taken for research. Based on the optimization problem established in (16) , the load loss of each substation is exhibited in Fig. 6 . Results indicate that attacking some of the substations will not cause load losses, and these substations are no longer considered when calculating risk in the following sections. 
3) RISK OF EACH SUBSTATION
Next, we apply algorithm 1 to calculate the probability P i−node of each substation. Fig. 7 presents a comparison of the risks in three different cases. The load loss and the risk of the first five buses with the greatest risk in case 2 are presented in Table 3 . It can be inferred from Fig. 7 that: (i) With the improvement of the proactive defense level of each cyber nodes, the risks of intrusion are reduced. (ii) In case 1, even if the system has a high level of proactive defense since the intruder continuously tries to intrude the node 1, the node connected to it also has the risk of being intruded. This shows that regardless of the level of proactive defense, the substations are still at risk of being infected by the virus. According to Fig. 7 and Table 3 , we can conclude that the risk of a node is determined by its infection probability and its possible load loss. The results indicate that the infection probability can influence the attacker's choices of the attack targets. From results in Table 3 , the failure of node 116 and node 68 can cause the same load loss (37.952 MW), but they may have different risks (23.568 MW and 22.505 MW) under intrusion. In accordance with the ranking of risk values, system operators can develop defense measures and enhance the defense capability of the vulnerable bus with a high-risk value.
C. DISCUSSION
In this section, we will further study the impact of the initial intrusion position and the load level on the virus spreading.
1) IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT INITIAL INTRUSION POSITIONS ON INFECTION PROBABILITY
Considering that intruders may perform intrusions from any location in the network, the impact of the initial intrusion location should be analyzed. Here, three initial intrusion locations are set at node 1, node 8 and node 119, respectively. The same payoff matrix of case 2 provided in Section VI-A2 is used. Fig. 8 displays the evolution process with the three different initial intrusion positions. According to the results in Fig. 8 , a conclusion can be obtained: Irrespective of which position the virus begins to intrude, the proportion of the intruded cyber nodes in the process will reach the same equilibrium. Although there are different trends in those evolution processes, there are no differences in the risk ranking results calculated by the algorithm. 
2) IMPACTS OF THE LOAD LEVEL ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS
Load loss is one of the factors that can affect the risks. In this part, the risks with the load ratio λ L ∈ [0.9, 1.2] are estimated. The infection probability of each node is calculated with the simulation parameters of case 2. Some results with different λ L values are shown in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that the risks can be influenced by the load variations. And also, there are no linear relationships between risks and λ L . Moreover, the situation with a lower load ratio may have a higher risk assessment result. For instance, the load losses calculated with λ L = 0.9 is higher than the corresponding losses calculated with λ L = 1.0. Furthermore, based on the DC redispatch model (16) and the simulation results, we can infer that the variations of the loads would not affect the ranking of nodes' risks.
It can be seen from the above test results that the topology of the cyber network and the load level of the physical power grid strongly influence the cyber-security risk of substations while changing the initial intrusion site has little impact on the risk assessment results. Thus, the proposed method should be carried out to filter out vulnerable substations facing the virus-based intrusions when some events happen. Those events include: 1) the topology of the cyber network is reconfigured; 2) the load level of the power grid changes significantly; 3) virus-based intrusion activities have been identified in some sites.
3) PRACTICALITY OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
Although some simplicities and assumptions have been done, the method that we establish is still practical in use. According to the introduction, long-term virus-based intrusions happened several times in the past. Nowadays, there have been quite a few relevant research works.. The virus-based model portrays the long-term process in detail.
Besides, the graphical evolution game is used to describe the dynamic interactions among the cyber nodes. The theory reflects the bounded rationality of the players, which indicates the practicality of the modeling method as well. At last, we proposed a risk index taking the infection probability into account. This index can help system designers to develop strategies in designing the communication network of the power system.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new approach is proposed to evaluate the risk of substations under the threat of cyber intrusion. The graphical evolution game is used to model the virus-based intrusion. We define the players, states/strategies and payoffs in the game and highlight the correspondences between the virus spread and graphical evolution game. On this basis, a simulation-based algorithm is proposed to estimate the infection probability of each node. Combining with the load losses calculated with a redispatch model based on DC power flow, the risk of each node can be obtained. The simulation results exhibit the detailed process of virus spread and are consistent with our intuition. This approach can assess the risks and identify the weak substations in the system. Then, the operators can develop a follow-up defense strategy to improve the security level of the system. In the future, the impact of changes in network topology on intrusion risk is still worth studying. Moreover, the optimal communication network topology to defense the intrusion will be explored.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EQUATION AND ITS SOLUTION
In the appendix, replicator equations are established to portray the virus spread, which reflects the state change dynamic of the overall network. Then, the detailed solution of the equilibrium of the proposed game is given as well.
A. DISTRIBUTION OF NODES AND EDGES WITH DIFFERENT STATES
To illustrate the evolution process of virus spread, the state distributions of nodes and edges are required to be focused.
According to the definitions before, P s , P ss , P sd and P ds can be defined as well. Besides, for two adjacent nodes, let P A|B denote the conditional probability to find an A-state player given that the adjacent node is occupied by a B-state player. Here, both A and B stand for s and d. According to the pair approximation theory [27] , the probability relationships between nodes and edges are given: P s + P d = 1 P s|s + P d|s = 1 P s|d + P d|d = 1 P sd = P ds · P d P s|d = P s · P d|s P ss = P s · P s|s P dd = P d · P d|d (18) In these equations, all variables can be expressed by P d and P dd (i.e., P d and P dd are independent variables), which reflect the node's and edge's changes between different states.
B. TRANSFORMATIONS OF FITNESSES
To establish the replicator function, the equations (10) and (11) needs equivalent transformations. The transformations are: (20) where f s⇐d is denoted as the fitness gained by d-state player who encircle the chosen player with state s. f s⇐s is denoted as the fitness gained by s-state player who encircle the chosen player with state s. For the selected node with k neighbors, k d represents the number of infected neighbors, while k s represents the number of susceptible neighbors. There is k = k d + k s . Then, detailed derivations are given to f s⇐d and f s⇐s . f d⇐s and f d⇐d can be calculated in the same way. Expectations are used to represent the distribution of node states. Among k neighbors of the selected node with s-state, each of the d-state neighbors has (k − 1)P s|d + 1 s-state nodes and (k − 1)P d|d d-state nodes connecting to it. In such case, according to (9) and (18), f s⇐d can be expressed as:
where λ(k) is the degree distribution of the network.
Similarly, the fitness expectation f s⇐s of the s-state center node's s-state neighbor is
Based on the above fitnesses, P s→d and P d→s can be calculated with (19) and (20) .
C. ESTABLISH REPLICATOR EQUATIONS OF INFECTION HAPPENED ON G C
Because the dynamic of the whole network can be described by P d and P dd , we just need to establish replicator equations for these two variables. The changes of P d and P dd are caused by the following three factors:
• Probability of nodes with different states being selected: For a d-state player, the probability that it is selected to update its state is P d . For a s-state player, the probability is P s .
• Probability that a neighboring node around the selected node has a certain state distribution: Suppose the selected node has k s s-state neighbors. This probability can be calculated as,
Similarly, we have
• Probability that the state of the selected node changes: According to the DB rules, for d-state node, the probability that its state shift from d to s is P d→s . For s-state node, the probability is P s→d . According to the three factors, the evolution dynamics can be represented. In one round game, the probability of a node changes its state from s to d is denoted as P( P d = 1 N ). This probability means that P d is increased by 1 N (where N is the number of N c ). P( P d = 1 N ) can be calculated as (25) Similarly, P d decrease by 1 N with probability (26) As for the dynamic of P dd , the change of the probability also relates to the above three factors. Regarding the relationship among nodes and edges, when a node change its state to d, P dd is increased by k d / kN 2 with
Similarly, P dd decrease by 2 k d kN with probability
Combining (25)-(28) and the assumption with ω 1, the replicator equations for P d and P dd are established to describe the dynamic of whole network. Based on (12) and (13), the replicator equations are as followṡ
where the parameter k, k −1 , φ 1 and φ 2 are given as follow
+P d|d ·u x (0, 0)−P s|s · u x (1, 1)−P d|s ·u x (1, 0) ] (33) φ 2 = ω · [(u x (1, 0) − u x (0, 0)) + (k − 1) · P d|s · u x (1, 0) +P s|s ·u x (1, 1)−P d|d ·u x (0, 0)−P s|d ·u x (0, 1) ] (34)
APPENDIX B OBTAIN AND ANALYZE THE EQUILIBRIUM OF VIRUS PROPAGATION
When it comes to the equilibrium of evolution game, two conditions should be satisfied, which areṖ d = 0 andṖ dd = 0. Combining with (18), (29) and (30), the equilibrium of virus spread on the whole network G c can be obtained as:
(u x (1, 1)−u x (0, 1))·k 2 + (u x (0, 1)−u x (0, 0) · k −U I ) (k + 1) · (k − 2) · U I
where U I = u x (0, 0) + u x (1, 1) − u x (0, 1) − u x (1, 0). For the whole network, the equilibrium is in a dynamic equilibrium. Considering that the structure of G c has a strong heterogeneity, the state of each node reaches equilibrium when the state of the entire network reaches equilibrium.
The theoretical derivations could also be used to describe the highest risk that the system can resist. When the parameters are roughly estimated, the defense ability of the whole power system can be obtained. According to defense ability, the equilibrium of the virus spread can be determined immediately.
Extremely strong and extremely weak defense abilities correspond to two extreme situations, respectively. One is that the virus cannot spread at all (i.e., P d = 0, P dd = 0). The other is that the virus will infect nodes in the entire network (i.e., P d = 1, P dd = 1). The equilibrium can help people quickly judge the safety level of the grid to make it more secure. He is currently a Professor with Tsinghua University. His research interests include power system complexity and control, game theory, and its application in power systems. VOLUME 7, 2019 
